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Recharacterization & Asset Securitization:
"When is a Duck a Duck"*
Mr. Martin Bienenstock, Mr. Marc Kieselstein &
Mr. David J. Fischer
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Good afternoon. We consoled ourselves for
this segment that in this field of recharacterizing transactions, nothing
anyone says can be totally wrong because there is a lack of self-evi-
dent rules, and that's what led us to put this topic on the agenda.
I thought I would start by charting the field in a certain way leading
up to a hypothesis to be tested by the panel and yourselves. And the
hypothesis that I'd like to put out there for testing is this: That when
you're talking about recharacterizing a transaction, you have to first
determine whether you're doing it under a statute or under an equita-
ble power, and if you're doing it under a statute, then if you satisfy the
statute, it's done. If you're doing it under an equitable power, it's not
enough to say this transaction looks more like a loan than a sale, so I
will make it more a loan than a sale. What I suggest is that you really
have to consider all the equities and make sure that the end result is
consistent with the equities as opposed to being dead set against them,
and I'll frame some hypotheticals as we go along to try to demonstrate
that.
What I said in the hypothesis is by no means accepted dogma or
jurisprudence. You're going to see in the jurisprudence that a lot of
courts and commentators characterize transactions by what I call the
scoring technique. They make a list as to how many attributes a trans-
action has that look like something else. And the more attributes it
has that look like something else, the more likely it is in their view
that the court should call it something else.
What I'm testing here in this discussion ultimately is whether the
scoring technique is really appropriate when you're recharacterizing
something not according to a statute, but according to an equitable
inquiry.
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the fourth panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Mega-Bankruptcies: Representing Creditors and
Debtors in Large Bankruptcies, held on April 10, 2003.
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So let me start with some basics. No one has a problem disregard-
ing a security interest if it's not perfected. Why? Because the Bank-
ruptcy Code gives the trustee a strong arm power which works even
under Revised Article 9. If the trustee is a lien creditor and under
Revised Article 9 a creditor has an unperfected security interest, the
trustee wins and the unperfected security interest loses. It's just as
simple as that.
There's a lot of commentary, some or all of you may know, about
Revised Article 9, and a lot of it has titles suggestive of its import,
such as the strong arm power is now the weak finger.
There are basically two attacks that some commentators have
launched against Revised Article 9, and I'll say upfront I had nothing
to do with revising Article 9. No one asked me my opinion then or
now. But one thing people complain about under Revised Article 9 is
that it's now possible to take security interests in assets that you either
couldn't take before or it was very difficult and subject to amorphous
rules, like, for deposit accounts, tax refunds, and a lot of intangibles.
And the theory is that this is bad because it can lock up more estate
assets, can encumber more estate assets prior to a bankruptcy, and
thereby leave fewer unencumbered assets with which to prosecute the
bankruptcy.
From my way of thinking, that's just much too parochial thinking.
It is good in the commercial world to have the ability to encumber an
asset. It could be the difference between being able to borrow $2 mil-
lion and $3 million.
And there's nothing wrong in the commercial world outside bank-
ruptcy with letting the lending institutions get liens, in my view, on all
assets. It just makes things more liquid, more commercial. It gives
people more options, and there shouldn't be a duty to keep things
unencumbered just in case there's a bankruptcy later on.
So I think it's clearly a benefit to commerce generally that Revised
Article 9 makes rules and enables the encumbering of assets that
before Revised Article 9 were somewhat questionable.
The second attack on Revised Article 9 by those who attack it
seems to be that the avoiding power is weakened because Revised
Article 9 bifurcates perfection against a bankruptcy trustee and
perfection against other creditors in respect of certain types of assets.
I've asked many bankruptcy judges lately what their experience is in
applying Revised Article 9, and if it has affected the administration of
their cases. And so far, unanimously, they've said to me it's never
come up. Now, some people explain that away on the grounds that it
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just hasn't been around long enough. I think it was basically codified
in about the year 2001. But so far I don't think it's had any effect.
Anyway, that's one recharacterization that I think is fairly simple
and straightforward in terms of saying a security interest shall not be
deemed a security interest if the trustee trumps it.
Another recharacterization, if you can call it that, is the avoidance
of a preference or a fraudulent transfer. You're basically saying some-
thing that was transferred has to come back, and I think that's pretty
straightforward, too, in terms of we know what the rules are. Every-
one knows them going in, and it's not subject to a whole lot of dispute.
There can be individual items in some cases, but they're not really
recharacterization issues that people gripe about because you have a
set of rules on which to enforce the statute.
Then we get to Section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code. Especially
§ 510(c), which takes what's on its face straightforward debt and equi-
tably subordinates it, makes it something less than plain vanilla debt
on a parity with all other debt. And that is something where there are
no crisp rules; although, jurisprudence has articulated some general
rules that we're familiar with, such as if you want to equitably
subordinate one claim to another, you have to show that the claimant
did something wrong to benefit itself that harmed other creditors, and
the remedy of equitable subordination should be compensatory and
not punitive, and that's generally the formula given.
Related to that has been the notion that some claims should be
recharacterized as equity in the first place. Now, this doesn't happen
under Section 510, because under that Section, claims can be subordi-
nated to claims, and interests-to-interests, but you don't take a claim
and make it an interest.
So the recharacterization of a claim in bankruptcy to an equity in-
terest pretty much follows non-bankruptcy law. The prototypical tem-
plate being the person who creates a corporation and who knows that
the new venture may be unsuccessful, so he or she takes a security
interest in all the corporation's assets, puts virtually no equity into the
corporation, gets a lot of unsecured debt to come in and participate in
the new venture, and when the new venture fails, the owner says, well,
sorry creditors, your claims aren't worth anything because I have a
lien on everything.
Now, in some cases where everyone knows what risks they're taking
upfront, it doesn't necessarily mean that the owner's secured claim
will be recharacterized as equity. But in other cases where it's less
than clear that the owner had a security interest upfront and there is
evidence of inducing people to come in without knowing facts - Yes?
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If it was filed with the Secretary of
State, why wouldn't these people be deemed to have knowledge of it?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: In that case, they may get away with it. It
may be the type of perfection, though, that you do by possession that
no one would know about.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: There are also notions, and this is where this
doctrine has been extended in some ways that are scary, where it's not
that someone undercapitalizes it from the beginning, but you've got a
situation where a company is in trouble and the owner decides, well, I
want to try and salvage the situation, but I don't have to put it in at
the bottom of the capital structure. I'm going to put it in as debt. I'm
going to paper it, and it's reasonable commercial terms.
But someone then later says when it doesn't work out, well, you
were just investing good money at the top of the capital structure to
try and salvage your out-of-the-money equity position. And in the
meantime, other people continue to extend the credit-deepening-in-
solvency-type theory.
It's a little frightening, and some of the Seventh Circuit law, for
instance, says, well, there is no reason not to have someone put in
money to try and keep a venture alive. We should be encouraging
that. On the other hand, if a commercial lender wouldn't have done
it, then maybe there's something not right about it. Of course, if a
commercial lender would have done it, it's highly unlikely you'd be
putting your own money into the situation in any event. So this area
of the law is kind of muddled.
I guess the other thing I would say on recharacterization is some-
times it's done in the reverse. That is, under § 510(b) you have people
with equity claims try and bootstrap themselves up the ladder by sug-
gesting that their equity claim is in fact some kind of breach claim.
Maybe they had a collar on their equity transaction, there are all sorts
of creative theories available, most of which have gotten very little
pedway. But you see that recharacterization going the other way, too.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Now, let's move to the next recharacteriza-
tion. Is a lease a loan? First we will discuss recharacterizations for the
sake of the antiforfeiture policy.
In the Ninth Circuit especially, but also in most of the other circuits,
you can find decisions where things have been recharacterized to
avoid forfeiture. The best examples I can think of are Ninth and Elev-
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enth Circuit decisions such as In re Morregia & Sons,1 the Waterkist
decision, 2 In re Ranch House,3 and In re Windmill Farms.4
As you know, Section 365 of the Code provides a Chapter 11
debtor-in-possession 60 days to assume or reject leases unless the time
is extended. And probably the section of the Code that has given rise,
certainly it's in competition for the section that gave rise, to the most
litigation and the most fears of attorney malpractice is Section 365.
Because on an unbelievable number of occasions, the debtor's attor-
ney wakes up on the 60th day and says, "Oh, my gosh, my client's
leases are going to be deemed rejected because I don't have an order
extending the time to assume or reject."
And different circuits have gone to different lengths to relieve the
debtor's attorneys of the malpractice claim. Some say that it's okay to
file your motion on that day. Some say you can file a motion to ex-
tend on that day. Others say, well, he can just file a motion to assume
on that day. I guess you can file a motion to assume and then change
your mind later.
But it's a very scary thing, and I don't know if it's happened to any
of you, but I will just put this in parenthetically. Traditionally, on the
first day of the case I ask the court ex parte to extend the confirmation
time to assume or reject all leases, subject to two very important pro-
tections for the nondebtor lessors. The first protection is that they can
come in and ask that the time be shortened at any time. And the
second protection is that when they come in, the burden of proof will
remain on the debtor-in-possession, not on the moving party. Subject
to those protections, it's nothing but a procedure that gets put into
place day one, which saves the debtor from forfeiting the lease, saves
the debtor's attorneys from malpractice, and is fair to the landlords.
This practice has actually been approved in reported decisions in both
the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit because it is fair. Furthermore,
it can be done ex parte because it is fair.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Now, do you get the order entered on a final
basis on the first day or is it put out for objection?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: It depends on the court.
MS. MILLER: Does it also include a provision that is an acknowledg-
ment of compliance with your obligations under § 365, and does it
have any triggering points where if you fail to comply, let's say, you
1. 852 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1988).
2. 775 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1985).
3. 773 F.2d 1166 (11th Cir. 1985).
4. 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988).
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fail to make the payment, that it triggers an expedited hearing in order
to get the-
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, sometimes the order provides the land-
lord can always get an expedited hearing, but usually we say just a
hearing subject to the court's docket, whatever.
MR. FISCHER: Do you have to pay stub rent?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: No, we don't get into substantive issues. It's
just a procedure.
MR. FISCHER: Well, but what I would suggest to you is when these
motions come up, it's an opportunity for a landlord to insist on things,
like stub rent, because the debtor is supposed to, on some level, make
a showing, when he gets the extension, that he's in compliance with all
terms. And that's where the stub rent issue comes up.
And I must tell you that I haven't been in one of your cases, but it's
a good way to trump the issue so it doesn't come up.
HON. FITZGERALD: Why would the stub rent issue come up in
that context?
MR. FISCHER: Because the landlords object and say that at that
point it has to be paid or the debtor is-
HON. FITZGERALD: Why? Because it's not a motion to assume?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: That's what my response would be. That
should be a separate motion.
HON. FITZGERALD: Absolutely.
MR. FISCHER: Well, the way it comes up is that you're not comply-
ing with all lease terms.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Right. If you want an extension under § 365 -
MR. FISCHER: You've got to pay stub rent. Whether you agree or
not that it's proper.
HON. FITZGERALD: But you are in compliance with the Code
provided that you're not paying your prepetition debt until you file a
motion to assume, at which point you have to show that you have a
reasonable chance to cure. But until you file that motion to assume,
as long as it's a prepetition claim, I don't see how you're in violation.
MR. FISCHER: But a smart debtor who files his case on the second
day of a month creates a great opportunity to get a lot of funding,
particularly in a retail context, and the way that that has traditionally
been righted is when the motion to extend comes up, there is a de-
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mand and usually somehow or other it happens that the stub rent gets
paid.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Under Section 365, rent has to be paid timely,
and there's a big issue that seems to have crystallized in the last sev-
eral years as to when the rent first arises. And it clearly does not first
arise when the lease is signed sometimes years before bankruptcy.
There's a lot of real property law to the effect that the obligation to
pay rent doesn't arise until the payment date. Normally it's the first
day of the month.
So then the argument or the question is, if the obligation arises the
first day of the month and you file the second day of the month, does
that mean that you no longer have an obligation to pay rent that
month? Your obligation was all prepetition. Do you get that month
for free, and then you start paying rent the next month? Or do you
pay pro rata for the 29 days or the 30 days or the 27 days you're in
bankruptcy that month? Courts are all over the lot on that.
And that dovetails with a bunch of decisions concerning a bill from
your landlord for real property taxes which are part of your rent. In
most shopping center leases you pay base rent, then you pay these
add-ons which include incremental real property taxes. If the period
the real property taxes accrued was prepetition but you get billed for
it post petition, is that a prepetition claim or a post-petition claim? If
it overlaps, do you pro rate it?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: This is an example of where you see that the
lawyers are not bogged down by foolish consistency because with the
same situation, we will take the position, for instance, that those real
estate taxes would all be prepetition even though the time for our
payment arose post petition because you've got to relate them back to
the prepetition period.
Part of the rent was due for the entire month on the 1st and we filed
on the 2nd, even though we occupied it for 29 days post petition we
would argue, entirely consistent in our minds, that that entire post-
petition period is in essence a prepetition claim.
MS. MILLER: And even though the taxes are defined in the leases as
additional rent, and you would think that thereby they would follow
along the same line, the cases go different ways even in the same cir-
cuit depending upon whether or not the obligation is pure rent for
occupying the space versus the tax component.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: As in the Handy Andy case.
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MS. MILLER: Right. And Koenig Sporting Goods and there's an-
other decision now in the Sixth Circuit on taxes going inward.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: To round out our detour into landlord-tenant
law, the issue also comes up in the context of percentage rent. If your
obligation is for the debtor tenant to pay the landlord a percent of all
sales once sales have exceeded a million dollars, how much of the per-
centage rent is due to the post-petition period? If the debtor got up to
a million dollars prepetition, are all sales post petition, post petition
rent, or do you look at the entire year and say, well, since you were in
bankruptcy for three-quarters of a lease year, you only pay three-
quarters of the percentage rent. The majority seems to be today that
once the threshold is met, everything after is post petition rent.
Okay. Back to recharacterization. What happened in Morregia was
that the debtor had a lease that I believe went several hundred years.
It might have even been 900, but it was several hundred, and the
debtor was in danger, because of § 365(d)(4), of losing the lease as a
forfeiture because it hadn't extended the time to assume or reject it.
And the court basically said was this is not the type of lease that
Congress had in mind with § 365, so for § 365 purposes, this is not a
lease, more of a fee title.
Clearly it was antiforfeiture. It was just too much to stomach that a
debtor was going to lose a leasehold like that where I think most of
the rent had been prepaid, as a matter of fact, because of the passage
of 60 days.
MR. FISCHER: Was it a ground lease?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Probably. Now, in the Second Circuit in a
case called PCH Associates, there are actually two of them, there had
been a sale-leaseback transaction which is fairly typical where the
people putting in the money, putting in $4 million got title to the land
and leased it back. The lease back gave them a fixed return on their
$4 million. A developer who put in other money to build the im-
provement on the land basically got the upside from improvement's
income.
If it were accepted as being what it said it was, then the return on
the land lease was an obligation under Section 365(d)(3) to pay that
timely. But, the debtor contended it shouldn't have to pay that rent
timely because it wasn't really a lease for purposes of § 365.
The Second Circuit looked at it and said, you know, the $4 million
doesn't look like that was really the value of the land. It was just part
of the overall deal that the people putting up the four were going to
get a fixed return, and the people putting up the other money were
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going to ride with the results of the venture. So we don't think this
was a lease for § 365(d)(3) purposes, and so timely rent doesn't have
to be paid. And the Second Circuit stopped short of saying what it
was. It just said all we have to decide is it's not a lease for purposes of
having to pay rent timely under § 365(d)(3).
So it went back to the bankruptcy court, and the debtor took the
position that if it's not a lease, it's obviously a joint venture. And the
bankruptcy court thought that was the right result, so it went back up
to the Second Circuit.
Now it's getting serious because the people who put in the $4 mil-
lion don't want to be told that they don't have a pretty ironclad right
to either ownership of the property, in which case they can sell it, or at
least a secured loan so they get their $4 million back. Now they're
being told they're like equity all of the sudden.
And the Second Circuit very methodically went through the trans-
action and said there's nothing hidden here. This isn't like a hidden
security interest where these people own the land and nobody knew it.
They had title to the land. It was in the public record. And while we
didn't acknowledge it was a lease for purposes § 365(d)(3), and this
group maybe shouldn't be deemed to have absolute title, because if it
has title, then it must have been a lease, we're not going to do some-
thing that is unfair just because the debtor is asking us. There's no
principle that says the debtor gets what it wants because it's the
debtor.
Some of us sometimes feel that too many decisions might go in that
direction. But to the extent most results in the bankruptcy court ap-
pear to the public as debtor-biased, my experience has been it's not
that the results are debtor-biased, it's that the Bankruptcy Code is
being enforced. And the Bankruptcy Code is unlike insolvency laws
in most every other country, except Ireland fosters reorganization and
rehabilitation before it fosters return of payment of creditor claims,
and the legislative history is clear about that.
So, anyway, getting back to PCH Associates. On the second time
around, the Court said we know we've prevented ourselves from say-
ing that the people who put up the $4 million have title to the prop-
erty, but that doesn't mean we're going to just take it away from them
and give them just a $4 million unsecured claim to the property be-
cause they thought they had rock solid title, and they didn't do any-
thing wrong. There's no inequity on their part. So what we're going
to do is we're going to give them an equitable lien against the property
for $4 million so they come out whole, but meanwhile, the debtor
didn't have to pay rent timely under § 365(d)(3) because we don't
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think this was really a lease for those purposes, and that was the end
result.
To me that's a very telling decision and very instructive for how
recharacterizations have to be analyzed. If you're doing a
recharacterization, you have to ask yourself, number one, why? What
would be wrong if I didn't do it? Well, in that case, § 365(d)(3) would
have been enforced against the transaction that maybe shouldn't have
been put into § 365(d)(3); although, that's probably not crystal clear
either except for the Second Circuit's first decision. But once having
made that decision, you just can't finish the recharacterization without
regard to the people-the creditors whose interests that you're affect-
ing or the owners whose interests you're affecting.
Okay. So that's antiforfeiture or recharacterization based on
equity.
Now, let me just throw out for you the nouveau transaction that is
now being considered in all sorts of Chapter 11 cases with no clear
results yet. But before I do that, let me just give you one more
recharacterization example it's the Second Circuit case called In re
Joseph Kanner HatCompany, Inc.5
In Kanner, a company called the Hat Company got $25,000 from a
bank and simultaneously transferred to the bank a receivable, a note
receivable that it held, and the transfer document was absolute. I
hereby transfer, sell, convey, da-da, da-da, da-da, this note to you.
The company gave a note to the bank for the $25,000, and the com-
pany's two principals, or shareholders, endorsed the note, basically
supplying their guarantees just in case the note was insufficient.
When the company ended up in bankruptcy later, the bank took the
position that the note receivable, that had been assigned absolutely,
was its property. The company took the position that it wasn't its
property, it was its collateral, and it had not perfected a lien against
the collateral.
And what the court did was it looked at the facts surrounding the
transaction, and the facts were that the bank, if it managed to collect
from the shareholders, was going to give the note back to the com-
pany. And if it managed to collect from the note receivable itself, it
was not going to go against the shareholders.
So Judge Friendly concluded that this was an easy one. Notwith-
standing what they wrote in the document, this note receivable was
obviously given as collateral, they forgot to perfect, and therefore the
bank has nothing but an unsecured claim against the hat company.
5. 482 F.2d 937 (2nd Cir. 1973).
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Well, how many people would decide it differently in addition to
you guys?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, I just- that's a good-I like the
ending of that.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Okay. Just before I jump over to what I was
going to say was the nouveau transaction, I wanted to go over one
other-
MR. FISCHER: But there's a key element in the Kanner case that
pervades everything, and it's there was no perfection. In his real es-
tate case, one could argue that by recording the deed, they in effect
recorded a mortgage because they created a public record so that no-
body else would be duped into losing their rights because of a hidden
lien and so forth. With this note, if it wasn't perfected, who would
know?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Right. And that's a very important point.
Yes?
GARY PLOTKIN: What I don't understand is that there are many
times when a person buys the piece of property on a net-net situation
whether it be the land you build or-I've got some shopping centers
where I have Wal-Marts as my tenant. They're all tripled in leases.
What's the difference? Basically at the end of the term, you end up
with the land because the buildings are down to zero.
MR. FISCHER: It's about a forfeiture.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: No, I think there is a difference. The differ-
ence is that you have classic net leases. There's no question that
they're leases, and there's no question that the rent should be paid
timely under § 365(d)(3). That's why subsection (d)(3) was put there
in 1984.
GARY PLOTKIN: How is yours any different?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: The difference in PCH Associates was, what it
looked like from the facts, that whether intentionally or accidentally
the owners of the fee lucked into treatment under § 365(d)(3) on what
could really have been considered a secured loan and shouldn't be
considered rent that has to be paid timely.
And the key fact was that the land was not worth the $4 million. It
was a lot more or a lot less, so it's clear that it was probably structured
in that way for tax purposes and because it satisfied people's invest-
ment objectives. But it was as if by happenstance they lucked into
§ 365(d)(3), which the court thought they shouldn't have.
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GARY PLOTKIN: But if the land-when you go into a transaction,
if the land has a value, and you are charging a reasonable rent for the
use of that land to a person who constructs the building in downtown
Chicago-
MR. BIENENSTOCK: That should not be recharacterized.
MR. FISCHER: But that's not what happened here. Also, there are
other cases like it where somebody would sell the property to a fund,
and then also give the fund a cash flow mortgage of some type, and
those transactions would be recharacterized as loans.
GARY PLOTKIN: Or if you had a high percentage rent or
something.
MR. FISCHER: But virtually all of these deals wind up with the eco-
nomics in a crash, and that's what really happened here. The court
recharacterized it because when it crashed, the "lessor" got way too
much for the value of his investment, and that was going to be a forfei-
ture against the debtor.
GARY PLOTKIN: I don't mean to belabor this, but at what point in
time do you look at the transaction to make that decision, at the time
the transaction took place or later?
MR. FISCHER: What he started with is nobody is ever going to be
right. Nobody is ever going to be wrong. And this has a lot of a feel
to it-once a court decides to recharacterize a transaction, get the an-
gels out because they're going to start dancing on the head of a pin.
And once the recharacterization starts, who can predict where it's
going to go because the transaction as recharacterized doesn't fit what
the parties wrote. And especially if the parties wrote this much, as
they often do, it gets a little strange when somebody says do you see
all those papers, they don't mean it.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: We've been advised we have five minutes to
cover the issue. This discussion can't end without at least mentioning
UCC Section 1-201(37), which is the section that gives criteria for de-
termining whether something is a lease or a security interest.
Now let's get to the nouveau transaction. A company sells an asset
to a special-purpose entity. The special-purpose entity has raised
money from the public or from banks that it uses to buy the asset. At
that point it seems all very plain vanilla.
But the special-purpose entity then enters into a separate-well, a
separate but integral transaction with the seller, and we'll call it a total
rate of return swap. Under that total rate of return swap, if the prop-
erty-if the asset that was sold to the special-purpose entity ultimately
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is sold for more than it cost and more than the money raised from the
outside to buy it, the upside goes back to the seller.
If, however, the asset is sold for less than it originally cost or it gen-
erates losses as opposed to profits, the seller is obligated to make good
on the debt the special-purpose entity raised to buy the asset in the
first place.
So there you have a situation where the asset is sold, but most of its
upside goes back to the seller, most of its downside goes back to the
seller. The reason I say most is that the special-purpose entity usually
issues two types of certificates. One is a debt certificate, and the other
is an equity certificate. And both the debt certificates with their inter-
est rate and the equity certificates with their returns get first call on
the profits and proceeds from the asset. And then after the lenders
and the equity owners are paid off, the surplus, if any, goes back to the
seller or the losses go to the seller.
And usually the equity owners are not guaranteed. The seller only
guarantees the amount of the financing that came from the debt
people.
If you use what I call the scoring technique, you would say notwith-
standing that the asset was sold, the seller retained all the attributes of
ownership. It had the upside, most of the upside, most of the down-
side, and it had control or management of the property all the way
through.
So if you're just using the scoring technique, you would say if the
seller goes into bankruptcy, the seller should get the asset back be-
cause it wasn't really sold. And the debt financiers and the equity
financiers of the special-purpose entity are now in deep, deep trouble
because they now have claims against an entity that doesn't have an
asset anymore. And that's very appealing, and I think a lot of courts
will do the analysis that way, and I just put that out there as a plausi-
ble result. Maybe that should always be the result. If you ask yourself
what are the equities here, you may not come out that way.
You could also say to yourself, well, what was the essence of the
transaction? The essence of the transaction looks more like a loan
than a sale. But that one I think you have to do a double-take on.
Why should we say that was a loan as opposed to a sale any more than
we should say that a loan is nothing but a sale with a total rate of
return swap attached to it? Why is one more substantive than the
other? And once you put it in those terms, I don't know why you
would say one is more substantive than the other.
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Now you go to a third way of analyzing this. What are the equities?
The asset was clearly transferred to the special-purpose entity. It
wasn't hidden. It wasn't on the seller's balance sheet after it was sold.
The people who financed the asset provided good money to finance
it. What is the great equity in telling them that they lose all their
money? The seller was already paid once for the asset, and now we're
saying because it gave a total return swap, it's going to take it back
and get the asset a second time. It's hard to come up with equities in
that situation.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: And there's a capital markets consideration if a
court wants to be sort of far seeking beyond the one case that's in
front of him that you'd wreak havoc in the financial markets if you
don't respect it.
MR. FISCHER: You'd create a much higher interest rate than you
would get because you created this remote mechanism.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, as the jurisprudence is today, I think the
scoring technique is so far in the majority and will likely prevail in
most of these cases. The substance of the transaction analysis to me
doesn't go one way or the other, but for those people who would tilt
it, they would say it goes in favor of the loan because not many people
look at loans and say, oh, that's a sale with a total rate of return swap,
although, I don't know intellectually why you couldn't say that.
And then if you look at the equities the debt financiers are losing
for no apparent reason. And I don't think you can use the argument
that you've got to go in favor of the debtor-in-possession if that's the
seller because what if the special-purpose entity goes into bankruptcy?
Now you have two debtors-in-possession, so which way are you going
to tilt? I don't think you can use the existence of a debtor in posses-
sion to tilt the result.
That's really the frontier in today's special-purpose transactions.
You might ask why people do what I just described. Why don't they
just set it up as a loan in the first place? And the reason, in at least
some cases, has been that it was a technique developed by fancy ac-
countants, investment bankers, and lawyers as to how companies
could control their quarterly earnings because a company would basi-
cally take one of its assets, sell it to a captive special-purpose entity for
a certain price that would yield a certain profit that would hit the
earnings that quarter and that's why it was a sale. A loan wouldn't
have had that effect. It would have just affected the funds flow. It
would not have affected earnings and losses.
So that's the genesis of a lot of these transactions.
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